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The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews 
of books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the 
rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both 
critical and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical 
material, and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philosophical.
The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinions' and contains second (and
usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the first part in earlier numbers of E&A. 
After a review appears in E&A (and after the 'second opinion' if one appears within the-­
next two numbers) the Editor will invite the author of the original work to submit a brief 
rejoinder to the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the 
Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second), or 
recommend works for review, should contact the Editor. 
Books 
R. G. Frey. I~TERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE 
AGAINST ANL~S (Oxford University Press), 
1980. 
This book might be more accurately sub­
titled: the case against the case for 
animals. It is an attack on the most popu­
lar philosophical argument for some form 
of animal liberation. Frey argues that 
"the Nelsonian argument for the moral rights 
of animals fails: premiss-­its major 
that all and only beings which (can) have 
interests (can) have moral rights--is 
dubious, and its minor premiss--that 
animals as well as humans (can) have 
interests--is false." One might have 
thought that the minor premiss could be 
established to most people's satisfaction 
and that the real work would come in 
evaluating the major premiss. Frey, 
howeve~, says little about the major 
premiss; most of his book is devoted to 
trying to show that the minor premiss is 
false. It turns out on Frey's views, 
remarkably enough, that animals do not 
have interests, desires, beliefs, emotions, 
perceptions, or reasons. The linchpin 
is the denial that animals have beliefs. 
If 'have interests' means 'have a good 
or well-being which can be harmed or 
benefited' or 'have needs', then ani­
mals have interests, says Frey, but so do 
tractors--so that can't be the relevant 
sense of 'interest'. If 'have interests' 
means 'have wants', in the sense of 'have 
desires', then animals do not have inter­
ests because they do not have desires. 
They do not have desires because they do 
not have beliefs. They do not have 
beliefs because they do not have language. 
Because they do not have beliefs, they 
also do not have perceptions, reasons, 
emotions, or moral feelings. The bulk 
of Frey's slim volume is devoted to 
developing these claims; it is not 
possible for me to consider here the 
details of his arguments, which merit 
consideration by philosophers, though 
I suspect that his dry and graceless prose 
will deter nonspecialists. 
But how does this bear on the question 
of how we should treat nonhumans? One 
might have thought that if they have no 
interests (indeed can't have interests) 
then that is the end of the matter. 
Apparently not. "But can animals be 
wronged," asks Frey in his Postscript, 
 "even if they have no interests? Yes, they 
can. For ... the 'higher' animals can 
suffer unpleasant sensations and so . . 
can be hurt; and wantonly hurting them, 
just as wantonly hurting human beings 
demands justifications, if it is not to 
be condemned." Indeed, Frey says in his 
final paragraph that "questions can still 
be raised about our treatment of animals." 
What, then, have we learned? We have 
learned, according to Frey, that "the 
answers cannot now consist in appeal to 
or reliance upon moral rights." I have 
no quarrel with this, but it is not enough. 
While some versions of the pro-animal 
argument have been tied to analyses of rights, 
others have not. Peter Singer's, for 
example, is not--as Frey recognizes--and 
Singer's version is certainly the one most 
influential among philosophers. 
The problem with Frey's case against 
animals (at least, one problem) is that it 
is too broad. He has no faith in the con­-
cept of rights; he doesn't really believe 
that humans have moral rights either. 
"And one important thing this means is 
that we have no moral right to an animal's 
confinement in zoos, to its ceaseless 
drudgery and labour on our behalf, to 
ies persistent exploitation in the name of 
cosmeti.cs, clothing, entertainment; and 
sport, to its blindness, dismemberment, 
and ultimate death in the name of science, 
and, to be sure, to its appearance on our 
dining-tables." The argument that animals 
don't have rights has always taken place 
against the background assumption that humans 
do; if animals had no moral rights, while 
humans did, then animals were thought 
to occupy a lower moral status than humans. 
This traditional argument attempted to 
answer moral questions about how, at least 
in general, animal welfare ought to be 
weighed against human welfare. Frey's 
argument, however, offers no such answers; 
perhaps they are to be expected in the book, 
~ODERN MORAL VEGETARIANISM, which he tells 
us is in preparation. The present book, 
however, does not in the end make a con­-
crete case either for or against animals. 
Frey's argument sometimes seems to 
reach beyond the context where debate about 
the moral status of nonhumans makes sense, 
as when he attacks the assumption that 
pain is in itself bad. "Why should 
unpleasant sensations be regarded as 
intrinsically evil?" Indeed, Frey considers 
it a "very real possibility" that nothing 
has intrinsic value (positiveOSiti  or negative). 
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Such matters are certainly worth considering. 
Though I find many of Frey's arguments con­-
fused or unconvincing, I think there are 
some interesting questions buried in this 
book. But there is no reason to believe 
that their answers will tell against ani­-
mals any more than against us nonanimals. 
Edward Johnson 
University of 
New Orleans 
